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Social Traps and Social Trust in a Devastated Urban Community 
 
Michael A. Cowan  
 
A “social trap” is a situation where individuals, groups or organizations are unable to cooperate 
owing to mutual mistrust and lack of social capital, even where cooperation would benefit all. . . 
People will cooperate only if they can trust that others will also cooperate. 
—Bo Rothstein, Social Traps and the Problem of Trust 
If people cannot trust that public officials will act according to norms such as impartiality, 
objectivity, incorruptibility, and non-discrimination they cannot trust “people in general” either. . 
. . If it proves that I cannot trust the local police, judges, teachers and doctors, then whom in this 
society can I trust?  
—Rothstein, Social Traps 
 
The last national survey of adult literacy prior to Hurricane Katrina found 40 percent of New 
Orleans adults reading at or below the sixth-grade level and another 30 percent at or below the 
eighth-grade level. During the three years before the hurricane, New Orleanians watched as public 
meetings of its elected school board became models of incivility, where the politically connected 
struggled for control of contracts and patronage and self-appointed activists ridiculed school 
officials, board members, and fellow citizens who were attempting to raise the performance of the 
city’s public schools out of the ranks of the nation’s worst. During this same period, neither citizens 
nor public officials were able to address the deplorable condition of the city’s once nationally 
acclaimed youth recreation department, even as homicidal youth violence escalated, putting New 
Orleans consistently at or near the top of national per capita murder rates. In short, the adults of 
the city proved unable to provide adequate public education and recreation for children and young 
adults. Their failure resulted in violence, economic despair, and deepening racial division.  
Shortly after his election as a pro-business, reform candidate in 2002, Mayor C. Ray Nagin 
was denounced at a press conference of clergy by one of the city’s most visible ministers as a 
“white man in black skin.” What had the new mayor done to so offend this powerful, politically 
connected minister and his colleagues? He had announced that under his administration, local 
congregations seeking federal grants distributed through the City of New Orleans for after-school 
programs for children and other social ministries would be required to secure that funding by 
responding to public requests for proposals and to give a formal accounting at the end of the grant 
period of how funds awarded were actually disbursed and with what results. This was hardly a 
radical policy. Rather it was and is the standard way of disbursing and accounting for public 
dollars. A member of mayor’s inner circle described this public denunciation, widely reported and 
replayed by local media, as having had a “chilling” impact on the new, reform-minded mayor, one 
from which he never fully recovered. 
On the evening of December 31, 2004, eight months before the hurricane that would change 
the city forever, a young African American man visiting New Orleans to participate in a flag- 
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football tournament was pinned on the ground by three white bouncers in a confrontation outside 
a French Quarter bar. He never arose. Levon Jones was suffocated on Bourbon Street that night. 
On a cold and rainy Thursday evening some weeks later, at Mayor Nagin’s request, I chaired a 
public meeting of the Human Relations Commission of the City of New Orleans in a packed city 
council chambers. During the meeting, the commission listened for more than three hours to 
expressions of public outrage and grief sparked by the killing and by the history of the New Orleans 
Police Department’s treatment of African Americans over many years. Threats of racial riots to 
destroy “this plantation” once and for all were sprinkled throughout the public testimony. 
As the atmospheric disturbance that would soon be christened “Katrina” formed over West 
Africa, she was not the only storm on the New Orleans horizon.  
 
Immediate Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina grazed the mandatorily evacuated city of New Orleans, 
reserving its most devastating force for coastal Mississippi just to the east. During the next two 
days, the federal levees, the wall between us and the water all around us, failed in multiple places. 
Eighty percent of the residences and businesses in the city went underwater. An estimated 1,833 
people died in the metropolitan area. The average cost of a US hurricane is about $20 billion; the 
cost of Katrina was $165 billion. Public officials warned residents and business owners that they 
might be unable to return for months. The scope of devastation in certain parts of the city made 
returning questionable indefinitely for many. Failures of coordination among local, state, and 
federal governments added to the collective misery, confusion, and uncertainty about the city’s 
future. 
In the hurricane’s wake, new hopes and old grievances shifted in uncertain balance, as the 
sense of a historic opportunity to build a better city for all clashed with people’s anxiety about 
losing whatever political and economic advantage they held before the storm. The profound 
disruption of local politics, religion, and economics resulting from massive flooding temporarily 
created a less racially charged atmosphere that would provide an opening for and provoke a contest 
about enhancing the well-being of the whole city through its rebuilding. For a moment, local civic, 
religious, and business leaders organizing for change across formerly impenetrable barriers of race 
and class did not face the massive political inertia and resistance that had met all such efforts before 
the storm. With those forces reduced, leaders could work together across racial lines for the well-
being of the city with a measure of hope. Organizing for change in the wake of Hurricane Katrina 
was like walking on the moon. 
 
A Disaster Gives Birth to a Transformation  
Among the important post-Katrina reforms was the establishment of an office to reduce waste, 
fraud, and abuse of power in city government. It was a play in five acts: a recommendation from 
the mayoral commission established to bring New Orleans back after the hurricane; passage by 
city council members of an ordinance establishing an inspector general’s office; approval by 
citizens of a charter change to protect the independence of the new office; the hiring of the 
founding inspector general; and the beginning of the work of the Office of Inspector General. (The 
“prequel” to this story may be found in David Marcello’s contribution to this issue.) 
 
Act 1: Bring New Orleans Back Commission 
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In November 2005, Mayor Nagin established the Bring New Orleans Back Commission, charging 
it to present him with recommendations on a number of critical dimensions of the rebuilding of 
the city by the end of January 2006. The commission consisted of working committees made up 
of civic, business, religious, and higher education leaders addressing culture, land use, public 
safety, infrastructure, city government, public education, economic development, and health and 
social services. 
Gary Solomon chaired the commission’s Government Efficiency and Effectiveness 
Committee, which I organized. The mission of the committee was to improve local government as 
one response to the challenges and opportunities of post-Katrina New Orleans, to foster city 
government that is effective, efficient, transparent, and adequately and fairly funded. The 
committee’s plan was to pick priority targets for change, identify examples of such changes already 
implemented in other cities, specify the steps necessary to put such proven practices in place 
locally, and establish a timeline for taking those steps. The committee’s agenda was to build trust 
in city government by achieving transparency: no more deals behind closed doors. 
In the temporary reduction of racial inertia caused by extreme political and economic 
disorganization immediately following Katrina, the guiding idea of committee members was that 
New Orleanians now had an opportunity not simply to replace what had been lost or damaged in 
the flood but to recreate city government for the greater benefit of all by fundamentally reforming 
its structures, policies, and operations. Our intent was sharpened by the observation of the 
committee’s expert adviser, former mayor Steven Goldsmith, that local government’s principal 
function is to assure businesses and citizens that the city’s future merits their investment. What 
makes businesses and residents feel that a city’s future warrants their ongoing tax dollars? Simply 
put, local government providing its services lawfully, fairly, and with limited waste—a concern of 
businesses and citizens everywhere. Waste, fraud, and abuse have been destroying cities and 
nations forever. Read any report on nations facing social disaster, and the word “corruption” will 
quickly appear. 
The post-Katrina emphasis on reforming city government was further energized by the keen 
recognition that if local leaders were not able to begin moving against New Orleans’s legendary 
and habitual practices of patronage, waste, and corruption, the massive public and philanthropic 
funding available and necessary for the renaissance of the city could be withheld or rigidly 
controlled. 
A review of national best practices to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in government provided 
to the committee by the research team of the Kennedy School of Government suggested that an 
independent office of inspector general was the most powerful mechanism available to promote 
government transparency and accountability. C. Daniel Karnes, the committee’s legal researcher, 
quickly discovered that the New Orleans city charter had mandated the establishment of an office 
of inspector general (OIG) in 1995, but an independent office had never been established. The 
significance of this finding was that “all” it would take to establish this key reform was an 
ordinance passed by city council. By contrast, another important post-Katrina reform of local 
government, the consolidation of seven local tax assessors into one, required a statewide majority 
vote to change the Louisiana constitution. This reform was also successful, but it was a much more 
costly undertaking involving, among other expenses, statewide television and radio ads. Such 
heavier lifts would not be immediately required to establish an OIG. Partly because of its strategic 
significance for reform at this critical moment in the life of the city and partly because the city 
charter already required its establishment, the Government Efficiency and Effectiveness 
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Committee prioritized establishing an OIG in its recommendations delivered to the mayor in a 
plenary public meeting of the Bring New Orleans Back Commission in January 2006. 
 
Act 2: Establishing the Office of Inspector General 
Campaigning for the first local elections for mayor and city council following Katrina began just 
as the Government Efficiency and Effectiveness Committee made public its priority 
recommendation to establish an OIG. The storm’s displacement of people registered to vote in 
New Orleans would make this the most highly charged election in New Orleans since the civil 
rights era. Thousands returned by bus and car from what many hoped would be temporary locations 
to cast their votes. It was a time of despair, anger, and confusion about the future.  
The campaign included a public conversation, framed most unfortunately by Mayor Nagin, 
about the importance of New Orleans’ remaining a “chocolate city.” Several reform-minded city 
council candidates, drawn to public service in the wake of Katrina, made establishment of the OIG 
a priority plank in their campaign platforms. 
When the votes were counted, three newly elected members of the seven-member city council 
were fully in support of creating the OIG. A fourth was open in principle, if proper checks on the 
power of the office could be put in place. At a critical juncture in the city’s history, New Orleanians 
had elected a majority reform-minded city council willing to embrace serious transformation of 
city government. 
Making the establishment of the OIG a priority for post-Katrina reform became the basis for 
two significant social partnerships of government, business, and civic leaders—one to establish 
the OIG in local ordinance, the other to offer it constitutional protection from politics by amending 
the city charter. 
Encouraged and supported by civic leaders, newly elected city council member Shelley 
Midura took the initiative to prepare an ordinance establishing an OIG for council consideration. 
She and her staff sought technical assistance from the national Association of Inspectors General. 
In fall 2006, the city council deliberated publicly on an ordinance recommended by the 
Government Affairs Committee to establish an OIG as required by city charter. During these 
deliberations in a public meeting of the council, the proposed OIG was first publicly labeled a 
“white power grab,” that is, an attempt by whites to accomplish by ordinance what they could not 
get at the ballot box—control over black government officials. Following several hours of intense 
public testimony and council deliberation, the committee passed the establishing ordinance after 
adding an amendment providing for an oversight committee to review OIG performance annually 
against its annual work plan. 
 
Act 3: Changing the City Charter to Protect the Independence of the Office of the 
Inspector General 
The city council members and citizen advocates who had collaborated successfully to pass the OIG 
ordinance and secure funding for its first year of operation were aware that every year a mayor 
could recommend, and a city council approve, reducing funding for the office in the annual city 
budget. The OIG’s effectiveness and sustainability depended not just on its capabilities and 
accomplishments but also on protecting it from continually shifting partisan political and 
patronage interests. This protection would require a funding mechanism not subject to annual 
approval or adjustment by the mayor or city council. 
Toward that end, citizen leaders worked with reform-oriented city council members to 
formulate an amendment to the city charter that, if approved by a majority of voters, would set 
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aside .075 percent of the city’s annual operating budget to fund the OIG and an Ethics Review 
Board. That formula would have amounted to $250,000 a year. As the city’s annual operating 
budget goes up or down, the OIG budget follows.  
The charter change proposal also included a provision negotiated by council members for the 
establishment of an office of independent police monitor (IPM) within the OIG. The inclusion of 
the IPM in the OIG made it timely for the local justice activist Norris Henderson and me to convene 
an interracial alliance of citizen groups to support the charter-change vote. It brought together 
organizations willing to support the police monitor but passionately committed to the OIG, others 
willing to support the OIG primarily because it would include an IPM, and some backing both. In 
community-based organizing, as in other social efforts, people can work for the same goal (here, 
a change to the city charter) with different motivations. 
Our intention was to deliver a strong vote for the OIG/IPM to organize a multiracial charter-
change alliance that also crossed lines of class and city geography. When the votes were cast in 
October 2008, 77 percent of voters supported the proposed charter change, with positive margins 
in all demographic subgroups. A more typical margin in New Orleans elections would be 65 to 35 
percent. This result meant that adequate and predictable annual funding tied to the city’s yearly 
operating budget was guaranteed for the OIG and the IPM. As an additional benefit, the OIG’s 
hard-won independence could provide political cover for the IPM. Only another majority vote of 
local citizens for a charter change could undo the offices or reduce their funding. The office’s 
citizen, business, and government advocates had provided the OIG with the maximum degree of 
independence possible in a local democracy, while simultaneously creating the city’s first 
independent entity to oversee police misbehavior. 
The process of establishing and protecting the independence of the OIG just described 
required three years of sustained public work by organized citizens and business leaders, engaging 
strongly with both sympathetic elected and appointed officials and vocal opponents. 
 
Act 4: Hiring the Founding Inspector General 
Passage of the OIG ordinance set in motion the appointment by the mayor of a seven-member 
Ethics Review Board (ERB), with six members nominated by local university presidents. The ERB 
is responsible for choosing the inspector general and overseeing the work of the office. It met for 
the first time in 2006 and initiated a search for the city’s first inspector general. From a national 
applicant pool, the board chose Robert Cerasoli, the former founding inspector general of 
Massachusetts. 
Inspector General Cerasoli swept into New Orleans like the proverbial whirlwind. He 
promptly informed local media, which was keenly interested in the advent of his office and not a 
little skeptical about the possibility of its success, that on refusing a city car and gas when he went 
to process his paperwork at City Hall, he was told, “But everybody gets a car and gas.” He declined. 
Thus began the well-publicized adventures of New Orleans’ founding inspector general. By 
patiently building positive relationships with city council members and making himself readily 
available to the media and the public, the inspector general became a public favorite and, with 
support from city council and civic leaders, was able to obtain approval of an initial annual 
operating budget of over $3 million, up from an initially proposed $250,000. He did so by 
singlehandedly drafting and winning civil service and city council approval for the roster of jobs 
he felt necessary to staff a credible office. For reasons of both symbolism and security, Cerasoli 
established the OIG outside City Hall, in the New Orleans Federal Reserve Bank, by far the city’s 
most secure building. With fully intended irony and a keen sense of local public interest, the OIG 
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announced that the target of his first investigation would be the city’s use of vehicles and fuel. To 
no one’s surprise, the resulting report found widespread waste and abuse and made 
recommendations to bring the city’s policies in line with recognized practices in the administration 
of a city motor pool. (They have been.) 
Despite professing support periodically for the establishment of the OIG, Mayor Nagin’s 
administration did little to facilitate setting up the newly approved office. In one memorable 
instance, the administration took several months to purchase the computers required to set up the 
office, after the funds to do so had been fully approved. This failure to support the office at a 
critical juncture, whether from incompetence or intent, delayed the inspector general’s attempts to 
begin the work of hiring a staff and developing an initial work plan. Subsequent investigations by 
the OIG contributed to felony convictions of the mayor and his cronies. 
Believing that business as usual in New Orleans city government could and must be 
interrupted if the city was to be rebuilt for the benefit of all after the hurricane, citizens and public 
officials successfully established the OIG as a nationally recognized method for creating 
enforceable standards of transparency and accountability for those holding public office. From that 
day forward, the commitment to reform local public institutions has been grounded, symbolically 
and pragmatically, in the OIG. That office is the principal lever that many civic and business 
leaders and government officials now pull to continue reducing waste and corruption in the public 
institutions of our city.  
 
Act 5: Accomplishments of the Office of Inspector General 
Since its establishment nearly fifteen years ago, the OIG of the City of New Orleans has 
investigated and issued reports on waste and corruption in numerous areas of city government. Its 
method is simple: Investigate and report. Sometimes the report is to the public, sometimes to legal 
authorities. The latter occurs when possible criminality is identified. Each public report includes 
an invited response from the investigated body. Finally, the investigated body is given notice that 
its response to the recommendations will be revisited on a specific date and the results made public. 
This process continues until the matter is resolved.  
A partial sample of OIG investigations includes purchasing, use of city vehicles, sanitation 
contracts, collection of hotel-motel taxes, accounts payable and fixed asset control, and private 
management of major post-Katrina infrastructure rebuilding projects. Also, it produced major 
reports on financial management, drinking water safety, theft by the city’s sewerage and water 
board, and deployment of police manpower and management of rape kits. A signal 
accomplishment of the OIG is the embedding for years of an investigator at the New Orleans 
airport, a place where graft and waste had long existed on steroids. In addition to publicly 
unraveling a problematic set of vendor contracts and overseeing the creation of new contracts and 
oversight, the OIG oversaw planning for and construction of a new airport. In recognition of that 
work, the airport commission received a lower interest rate on major bonds.  
The office has also produced numerous public letters calling the attention of the mayor, city 
council, chief administrative officer, and others to practices that have left the city vulnerable to 
waste and corruption in expense reimbursement, awarding of city contracts, procurement of goods 
and services, electronic monitoring of parolees, disadvantaged business enterprises, and proposed 
contracts for remodeling the city’s municipal auditorium. The office conducted investigations of 
the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad, the French Market Corporation, and the city’s crime 
surveillance cameras. It published a report detailing $2.5 million wasted annually by the city’s 
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traffic and municipal courts. These and other investigations led to increased public scrutiny, 
specific recommendations for change, and sometimes criminal indictments. 
The range and quality of the OIG’s work belies the attempt to delegitimize the office by 
portraying it as an instrument of whites to check black politicians. The OIG is the first effective 
force to interrupt the history of waste, fraud, and abuse of power in New Orleans. The OIG has 
created a mechanism for transparency that for the first time in the city’s history allows city 
administrators, legal authorities, and citizens to hold elected and appointed officials accountable 
for their stewardship of public resources. The OIG has done what few could have imagined, and 
none had been able to accomplish before the storm: It has created a baseline public expectation 
that waste, fraud, and abuse of power by elected or appointed officials are no longer to be laughed 
off. It is much more likely to be exposed, with timely and serious consequences for those who risk 
misusing public office for personal gain. Waste and corruption can no longer be practiced with 
impunity. This is a new thing in three hundred years of New Orleans history. 
For the first six months of Act 1, the responses I received even from progressive business and 
civic leaders when I raised the possibility of having an inspector general in New Orleans ranged 
from an amused shake of the head to “In New Orleans? You must be crazy!” to “Good and evil 
are in the soul of New Orleans. If you take away evil, you’ll kill the city.” One prominent local 
media figure opined that a functioning inspector general would be the “biggest change in New 
Orleans since the Civil War.” Fifteen years after the Government Efficiency and Effectiveness 
Committee of the Bring New Orleans Back Commission first put the idea of an inspector general 
out there as a possibility, the local citizenry and public officials, the cynics and skeptics, have new 
possibilities to consider and the media representative’s words may yet prove to be prescient. 
 
Social Traps and Social Trust: Public Institutions, Economic Opportunity, and 
Intergroup Conflict 
There is a deep pattern underlying the workings of corruption in public institutions. It has been 
called the “social trap.” It occurs when there is insufficient trust to allow members of different 
groups to cooperate, even when the interests of all groups would plainly be served if they could 
do so.1 Such situations are the result of historical struggles among racial, ethnic, religious, or 
socioeconomic groups over freedom, dignity, power, and resources. Racial conflicts are a classic 
example of social traps.  
Bo Rothstein explains that when a social trap drives intergroup relations, it is not possible to 
overcome it at scale by directly building or strengthening voluntary relationships based on shared 
interest among members of groups in conflict. No number of better face-to-face relationships will 
resolve an intergroup conflict over the basic things that matter. The antidote to social traps is social 
trust, which arises only as access to economic opportunity grows for all who are prepared to work 
and learn. And that opportunity, in turn, is the product of good public institutions.  
A “good public institution” is defined here as one that operates lawfully, fairly, efficiently, 
and effectively. On the link between institutions and social trust, Rothstein writes: “The more trust 
people have in political and administrative institutions, the more they are inclined to feel social 
trust in their fellow human beings, or the reverse: the more people believe that other people can 
generally be trusted, the more they trust in social institutions.”2 He adds: “If people cannot trust 
that public officials will act according to norms such as impartiality, objectivity, incorruptibility, 
and non-discrimination, they cannot trust ‘people in general’ either.”3 Corrupt and wasteful public 
institutions do not stop at wasting and stealing public money; they also destroy trust between, 
among and within human groups. They fuel social traps. 
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The level of social trust required to break through social traps by cooperative intergroup relations 
is created indirectly through maintaining good public institutions that make economic opportunity 
available fairly. How people in general view the integrity of public officials administering and 
enforcing institutional rules shapes how they view the general trustworthiness of their fellow 
citizens: “If it proves that I cannot trust the local police, judges, teachers, and doctors, then whom 
in this society can I trust?”4 It is a question worth pondering, one that always has answers that 
always matter. 
The story of the New Orleans OIG details the creation of a public entity constitutionally 
mandated to push hard for good public institutions. In the light of the antithetical forces of social 
traps and social trust, the OIG appears as a powerful instrument for two critical steps that must be 
taken for the well-being of any city.  
First, community leaders committed to increasing economic opportunity for all who are 
willing to learn and work must see to it that local public institutions that are supported by tax 
dollars serve all who are entitled to their protection and services fairly, efficiently, and effectively 
through programs such as adult literacy, community policing, workforce preparation and 
placement, and re-entry services for former prisoners. Local governments doing such things well 
and free of corruption makes businesses and citizens believe that investing in their city’s future 
makes sense. It is also true that those who face the biggest economic challenges are the ones who 
most need government services, because they cannot provide privately for education, health care, 
neighborhood security, and so on. Absent good public institutions, the politics and economics of 
any city will degrade into social-trap power struggles among actual and would-be insiders, while 
access to opportunity for outsiders continues to diminish. This has been the pattern in New Orleans. 
Whatever the particular issue of the moment, the underlying, unchanging purpose of the OIG is to 
produce good public institutions. The examples of OIG accomplishments described earlier 
illustrate this critical point. 
Second, New Orleans leaders committed to creating institutional conditions that promote 
expanding economic opportunity for all by establishing the OIG have also and simultaneously put 
their city on a path to building social trust among groups caught in social traps. No form or amount 
of multiracial or interfaith dialogue or education will add significantly to a city’s reservoir of 
intergroup trust as long as corrupt institutions cause some to be assisted and others to be limited in 
achieving economic success, not because of their capacities, but because they do or do not belong 
to particular groups. Insider dealing corrupts institutions, damages economic development and 
opportunity, and heightens racial tensions. Whatever its particular purpose, every good public 
institution moves the body politic from traps to trust. 
In summary, good public institutions are a direct link to increasing economic opportunity for 
all and an indirect link to building social trust among historically divided groups. Public 
institutions, economic opportunity, and social trust go together, for better and for worse. The OIG 
is a powerful influence now available to strengthen those links in New Orleans. If successful, its 
three principal outcomes will be directly reducing waste and corruption and indirectly reducing 
racial tension and enhancing economic opportunity for all who are willing to work and learn. 
 
Where to Start? 
Social scientists have made a compelling case that economic opportunity, honest and efficient 
public institutions, and social trust go together, their findings suggest three differing 
recommendations about where to start in order to move the circular relationship among the three 
factors in the positive direction. 




Starting with Trust 
 
 
Those who start with social trust believe that if you want to build the public institutions that are 
necessary to support the creation of economic opportunity, you should bring together people who 
have been divided, by encouraging the formation of groups based on shared hobbies and other 
interests, social concerns, geographic proximity, and so on. A civil society rich in “voluntary 
associations” provides the social glue that makes it possible for governmental and business 
institutions to function properly.5 This approach to building social trust is direct: Members of 
historically alienated groups must meet face-to-face in voluntary associations in order to create the 
social trust required for good government and economic growth. 
 




Those emphasizing economic opportunity believe that markets left free to function will reward 
competence, create a growing pool of economic opportunities, and generate a stronger tax base to 
support necessary government services.6 They are convinced that government attempts to create 
economic equality by forced redistribution schemes involving taxation of businesses and 
individuals or social policies, such as affirmative action, that give advantages to members of some 
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destroy the market’s job-creating power by distorting the dynamics of economic competition and 
chasing businesses into jurisdictions with transparent, consistent ground rules applied 
evenhandedly to all.7 When local economies flourish, more households build assets, local 
governments have the resources to address public concerns, and social trust rises. But when 
business owners must “pay to play,” that is, bribe local officials directly with envelopes or 
indirectly with campaign contributions in order to get contracts or permits, or when public 
decisions are “steered” by nepotism, ethnicity, or political affiliation, the economic base and the 
employment opportunities only it can generate, the tax revenues it produces and social trust spiral 
downward together.8 From this perspective, public institutions play a limited but crucial role in 
economic development: They establish and enforce transparent rules and norms for all, starting 
with property rights and equal treatment under the law, without which businesses and individuals 
will not invest in local communities and underlying inequalities cannot be addressed. 
 




Those whose starting point is the integrity of public institutions believe that ensuring that 
institutions that are truly universal, that is, that serve all citizens efficiently and effectively (not 
wastefully), honestly (limiting corruption and cronyism), and fairly (without regard for ethnicity, 
wealth, or connections) is the single most powerful way to create social trust in a community.9 
First, a definition: “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.”10 They consist of formal and informal 
rules and mechanisms of enforcement. Institutions are the rules of the game and their enforcement; 
individuals and organizations are the players.  
When public institutions reduce waste of public resources, diminish corruption, and treat all 
entitled to their services equally, they increase social trust indirectly by creating the ground rules 
necessary to generate economic opportunity for more people.11 The likelihood that people in 
general will trust each other—especially in circumstances where there have been significant ethnic, 
religious, or class conflicts and divisions—goes up as members of all groups experience the 
reduction of waste, corruption, and discrimination by public institutions, such as planning 
commissions, school boards, and city halls. When those institutions functional universally, that is, 
efficiently, honestly, and fairly for all, additional belief in “the system” fuels economic opportunity 
for all and breeds trust of other people in the community. When and so far as public institutions 
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to taxpayers, economic opportunity is limited and mistrust blocks and fractures relationships 
among people, reinforcing histories of division. A community’s public institutions make possible 
and limit its economic vitality and opportunity, which in turn affect levels of trust among its 
various groups. Public integrity, economic opportunity, and social trust spiral up and down 
together. 
Contrary to popular local and national opinions, the fundamental problem facing American 
cities is not poverty. Nor is it racism.12 Those are symptoms of a deeper social malady. What has 
many American cities in steady decline is an underlying deficit of social trust, social traps. New 
Orleanians struggle to negotiate with integrity across race and class lines to bring into being a city 
that works better and more equitably for all groups. Both locals and outsiders typically misattribute 
our social dilemma to racism, the indifference of the wealthy, or pathology in poor black families; 
but an intergroup impasse over goals and action is the underlying social trap in which New Orleans 
and other American cities continue to be caught.13 This awareness becomes plainer and more 
painful as we look to the east and to the west where our sister cities of Atlanta, Houston, and San 
Antonio find ways out of this trap and flourish as a result. In the years since Katrina drew an 
indelible line in one American city, history has done us the painful service of keeping a bright 
public spotlight on our crippling social traps. And while the uniqueness of the Crescent City is 
rightly legendary, what plagues our body politic is by no means our challenge alone: The 
incapacity of elected, business, and civic leaders to compromise and act across race and class lines 
for the common good is the American dilemma.14 The story of one American city is a variation of 
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